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Dynamics of information flow in adaptively interacting stochastic processes is studied. We give
an extended form of game dynamics for Markovian processes and study its behavior to observe in-
formation flow through the system. Examples of the adaptive dynamics for two stochastic processes
interacting through matching pennies game interaction are exhibited along with underlying causal
structure.
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When studying the interaction and evolution of many
stochastic processes that are endowed with the ability
to adapt to their enviroment, a natural question arises:
how does information flow though the system and, more-
over, how can we measure or calculate this information
flow? From the viewpoint of large networks of stochas-
tic elements, flow of information in the network has been
studied [1, 2, 3, 4]. In general, mutual information is not
a representative measure of information flow in adaptive
dynamics as its causal structure forms a complex net-
work, making the concept of information flow unclear.
To address this problem, we give an extended form of
game dynamics for interacting Markovian processes and
investigate information flow quantitatively.
Suppose that N stochastic processes X1, . . . , XN are
interacting with each other. At each time step τ , the
unit n sends a symbol sn ∈ {0, 1} to the other units and
receives at most N − 1 symbols from the other units.
We denote the global system state as s = s1 · · · sN . The
next symbol sent by the unit n, s′n, is dependent on the
symbol received from the previous global state, s. Local
transition probabilities for n-th unit are described as
x
(n)
sn′|s
= P (Xn(τ+1) = sn
′|X1(τ) = s1, . . . , XN (τ) = sN ),
where n = 1, . . . , N and x
(n)
0|s + x
(n)
1|s = 1. The transi-
tion probabilities (x
(n)
0|s , x
(n)
1|s ) is an element of a simplex
denoted by ∆
(n)
s .
We introduce a local adaptation process to change
transition probabilities x
(n)
sn′|s
, assuming that adaptation
is very slow compared with relaxation time of the global
Markovian process. After the system reaches a station-
ary state, each unit independently changes its stochastic
structure by changing its transition probabilities. As-
suming strong connectivity of the global Markovian ker-
nel, we study dynamics of transition probabilities in an
ergodic subspace. This assumption corresponds to per-
sistency of dynamics of transition probabilities x
(n)
s′
n
|s in
the state space. Time evolution of x
(n)
s′
n
|s is driven by
simple stochastic learning through interaction: reinforce-
ments for transition probabilities of the unit n to send 0
and 1 in the previous global state s are given by the
constants a
(n)
0|s and a
(n)
1|s . The conditional expectation re-
inforcements R
(n)
sn′|s
to chose each symbols sn
′ given the
previous state s are calculated with a
(n)
sn′|s
, xsn′|s, and the
unique stationary distribution. For Xn, we give adaptive
dynamics for probabilities of s′n given s for t ∼ t+∆t
x
(n)
sn′|s
(t+∆t) =
x
(n)
sn′|s
(t)e
β(n)R
(n)
sn
′|s
(t)
∑N
n x
(n)
sn′|s
(t)e
β(n)R
(n)
sn
′|s
(t)
, (1)
where β(n) is the learning rate for the unit n. Here ∆t is
much larger than the relaxation time of the global Marko-
vian process. The continuous time model is given as
˙
x
(n)
sn′|s
(t)
x
(n)
sn′|s
(t)
= β(n)(R(n)(t)sn′|s −R
n
|s(t)), (2)
for n = 1, . . . , N , where R
(n)
|s =
∑
sn′
x
(n)
sn′|s
R
(n)
sn′|s
is the
conditional expectation of reinforcements over all pos-
sible symbols given the previous system state s. Intu-
itively, when (R(n)(t)sn′|s − R
n
|s(t)) is positive, that is,
the conditional expectation reinforcement for a symbol
sn
′ given s is greater than the average of the expecta-
tion reinforcement given s, the logarithmic derivative of
x
(n)
sn′|s
(t) increases, and when negative, it decreases. The
learning rate, β(n), controls the time scales of the adap-
tive dynamics of each unit n. (See [5] for the derivation
of this model.) Note that Eq. (2) represents adaptive
dynamics with finite memories. Higher dimensional cou-
pled ODEs are required for multiple Markovian process
and PDEs for non-Markovian process with infinitely long
memories.
Suppose that two biased coin tossing processes X and
Y adaptively interact with each other. They produce a
pair of symbols ij at each time step, where i and j are ei-
ther heads (0) or tails (1). At the next time step, X send
a symbol i′ to Y based on the previous pair of symbols
2ij, and vise versa. If there is a causal interaction with
one step memory, the global stochastic process becomes
a simple Markovian process. When X ’s and Y ’s behavior
are causally separated, the whole system is a product of
two biased coin tossing processes (case 10 in Fig. 1).
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FIG. 1: Possible causal structure (case 1-10): X → Y in-
dicates that Y receives symbols sent by X (information flow
from X to Y). Dashed arrows indicate ignorance of received
symbols (no information flow).
Considering Fig. 1, the extreme cases are 1 and 10.
Case 1 corresponds to the situation, “each unit has one
step memory of the previous global state s,” and case
10 to, “no information of s.” Local transition probabil-
ities of X and Y are given as (xi′|ij) = P (X
′ = i′|X =
i, Y = j), and (yj′|ij) = P (Y
′ = j′|X = i, Y = j), where∑
i′ xi′|ij =
∑
j′ yj′|ij = 1. The global Markovian ker-
nel is given with (xi′|ijyj′|ij) where
∑
i′,j′ xi′|ijyj′|ij = 1.
When X and Y match heads (0) or tails (1) of coins
(00 or 11), Y reinforces the choice, and when they don’t
(01 or 10), X reinforces the choice. This interaction is
called the matching pennies game in game theory. The
reinforcements are given by a bi-matrix
(A,B) =
([
−ǫX ǫX
ǫX −ǫX
]
,
[
ǫY −ǫY
−ǫY ǫY
])
, (3)
where 0 < ǫX , ǫY < 1. The intereaction matrices, A =
(aij) and B = (bji), are the reinforcements for X and Y
for the global state ij. The Nash equilibrium of the game
(3) in terms of game theory is an uniformly random state
(1/2, 1/2). The conditional expectation reinforcements
are given by RX
i′|ij = (Ay|ij)i′ and R
Y
j′|ij = (Bx|ij)j′ ,
where x|ij = (x0|ij , x1|ij)
T , and y|ij = (y0|ij , y1|ij)
T . Eq.
(2) reduces to
˙xi′|ij
xi′|ij
= βX [(Ay|ij)i′ − x|ij ·Ay|ij ],
˙yj′|ij
yj′|ij
= βY [(Bx|ij)j′ − y|ij ·Bx|ij ]. (4)
Eq. (4) corresponds to adaptive dynamics for an interact-
ing Markovian processes in an 8-dimensional state space
Πi,j∆
X
ij × ∆
Y
ij , which is in the form of standard game
dyamics. Similarly, for case 10, we have
˙xi′|∗∗
xi′|∗∗
= βX [(Ay|∗∗)i′ − x|∗∗ · Ay|∗∗],
˙yj′|∗∗
yj′|∗∗
= βY [(Bx|∗∗)j′ − y|∗∗ · Bx|∗∗], (5)
where x|∗∗ = (x0|∗∗, x1|∗∗)
T , and y|∗∗ = (y0|∗∗, y1|∗∗)
T .
Here, the * indicates ignorance of received symbols. Eq.
(5) is, again, standard game dynamics in a 2-dimensional
state space ∆X × ∆Y . It is known that the dynamics
of Eq. (5) is Hamiltonian with a constant of motion
H = 1/βXD(x∗||x) + 1/βYD(y∗||y), where D is Kull-
back divergence, and where (x∗,y∗) is the Nash equilib-
rium of the game (A,B). The dynamics are neutrally
stable periodic orbits for all range of parameters ǫX , ǫY
[6, 7]. When the degree of freedom of the Hamilto-
nian systems is more than 2, and the bi-matrix (A,B)
gives asymmetric cyclical interaction, the dynamics can
be chaotic [5, 8, 9]. Summarizing, if all units have com-
plete information of the previous global state s (case 1),
or they are all causally separated with no information of
s (case 10), we have a family of standard game dynamics
given by Eqs. (4) and (5).
For intermediate cases 2− 9, showing in Fig. 1, where
units have partial information of s, we have explicit sta-
tionary distribution terms in the adaptive dynamics. As-
suming the process is ergodic, 0 < xi′|ij , yj′|ij < 1, an
unique stationary distribution (p(i, j)) exists. We de-
note the marginal stationary distributions pX = (P (X =
0), P (X = 1))T , pY = (P (Y = 0), P (Y = 1))T . The
conditional stationary distribution of i, given the previ-
ous state j, is denoted as p(i|j) = p(i, j)/p(j), and those
of j, given the previous state i, as p(j|i) = p(i, j)/p(i).
For case 2, with RX
i′|ij = (Ay|i∗)i′ and R
Y
j′|i∗ =∑
j p(j|i)(Bx|ij)j′ , Eq. (2) reduces to
˙xi′|ij
xi′|ij
= βX [(Ay|i∗)i′ − x|ij ·Ay|i∗], (6)
˙yj′|i∗
yj′|i∗
= βY [(
∑
j
p(j|i)Bx|ij)j′ − y|ij · (
∑
j
p(j|i)Bx|ij)].
Similarly, for case 5, with RX
i′|∗j = (Ap
X)i′ and R
Y
j′|i∗ =
(BpY )j′ , we obtain
˙xi′|∗j
xi′|∗j
= βX [(ApY )i′ − x|∗j · Ap
Y ],
˙yj′|i∗
yj′|i∗
= βY [(BpX)j′ − y|i∗ · Bp
X ]. (7)
Note that (p(i, j)) are given as a function of (xi′|ij)
and (yj′|ij), thus the equations of motion are in a closed
form. For cases 2−9, we have nonlinear couplings with a
stationary distribution, which is in contrast to the quasi-
linear coupling of standard game dynamics. Eq. (6) - (7)
are both in an extended form of standard game dynamics.
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FIG. 2: (Top) Case 1: Neutrally stable quasi-periodic
tori. (Middle) Case 2: A combination of quasi-
periodic tori and transients to a heteroclinic cycle. (Bot-
tom) Case 5: (a) Transients to a heteroclinic cycle
which consists of vertex saddles (x0|∗0, x0|∗1, y0|0∗, y0|1∗) =
(0, 0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1, 1) and (b) conver-
gence to one of infinitely many neutrally stable fixed points
which gives an uniform stationary distribution p(i, j) =
1
4
; (in this case, converging to (x0|∗0, x0|∗1, y0|0∗, y0|1∗) =
(0.539057, 0.460943, 0.671772, 0.328228)) are attracting sets.
Let us now consider several examples. In examples,
where the parameters are fixed to βX = βY and ǫX =
ǫY = 0.5, we have four types of dynamics: (1) neutrally
stable periodic motion of Markovian kernel, (2) conver-
gence to a fixed Markovian kernel that gives a uniform
stationary distribution, (3) sharp switching among al-
most deterministic Markovian kernel, (4) a combination
of (1)-(3). In contrast to the matching pennies game dy-
namics which shows only neutrally stable periodic orbits,
we obtain new types of dynamics naturally given by the
Markovian structure.
Case 1 (Eq. (4)): Neutrally stable quasi-periodic
tori are observed. They are simply a product of peri-
odic orbits in the matching pennies game dynamics. The
dynamics of Eq. (5) is embedded in a subspace in the
state space, given by xi′|00 = xi′|01 = xi′|10 = xi′|11 and
yj′|00 = yj′|01 = yj′|10 = yj′|11.
Case 2 (Eq. (6)): A combination of the dynamics of
Eq. (4), quasi-periodic tori, and the dynamics of Eq. (7),
transients to a heteroclinic cycle, are observed (Fig. 2,
middle). One of the infinitely many attracting periodic
orbits corresponding to periodic orbits in Eqs. (4) is se-
lected depending on initial conditions.
Case 5 (Eq. (7)): Bi-stable dynamics is observed.
A manifold which gives uniform stationary distribution
p(i, j) = 1/4, is an attracting set. Fixed points on this
attracting manifold are all neutrally stable. Heteroclinic
cycles which consists of several vertex saddles are also
attracting sets. Depending on initial conditions, either
convergence to one of the fixed points on the attracting
manifold or transients to one of the heteroclinic cycles
are observed (Fig. 2, bottom).
In standard game dynamics which describes causally
separated stochastic process, information flow is always
0. By using the Markovian extention of game dynam-
ics, we can now quantify bi-directional information flow
between stochastic units. Eq. (9) gives conditional mu-
tual information of Y and X ′ given Y and X ′, which is a
measure of stochastic dependence of X ′ and Y (sometime
called transfer entropy, see [10, 11, 12, 13]). Recently, a
new measure of information flow which describes devia-
tion of two random variables from causal dependence, is
formulated by Ay and Polani [4]. Information flow from
Y to X ′, given X and Y , is defined by Eq. (9) as a
measure of causal dependence.
I(Y : X ′|X,Y )
=
∑
i′,i,j
p(i′, i, j) log
p(i′|i, j)∑
j p(j|i)p(i
′|i, j)
= −
∑
i′,i
p(i)(
∑
j
p(j|i)xi′|ij) log(
∑
j
p(j|i)xi′|ij)
+
∑
i,j
p(i, j)[
∑
i′
xi′|ij log(xi′|ij)]. (8)
I(Y → X ′|X,Y )
=
∑
i′,i,j
p(i)p(j)p(i′|i, j) log
p(i′|i, j)∑
j p(j)p(i
′|i, j)
= −
∑
i′,i
p(i)(
∑
j
p(j)xi′|ij) log(
∑
j
p(j)xi′|ij)
+
∑
i,j
p(i)p(j)[
∑
i′
xi′|ij log(xi′|ij)]. (9)
In the case that Y is a fixed information source,
(y0|00, y0|01, y0|10, y0|11) = (1, 0, 1, 0), the dynamics (4)
4with βY = 0 monotonically converges to an optimal
(x0|00, x0|01, x0|10, x0|11) = (0, 1, 0, 1). The system state s
is either 00 or 11 and X is always rewarded. In this case,
I(X : Y ′|X,Y ) = 0, I(X → Y ′|X,Y ) = 0, (10)
I(Y : X ′|X,Y ) = 0, I(Y → X ′|X,Y ) = log 2.
There is information flow from Y to X because X re-
ceives symbols sent by Y and extracts information from
Y ’s behavior. Thus, X is not stochastically dependent
on Y but, is causally dependent on Y . The above mea-
sure defined by (9) clearly captures this property. Thus,
intuitively, we can say that I(Y → X ′|X,Y ) is a more
appropriate measure of the information flow.
As shown in Fig. 3, we observe (case 1) aperiodic,
(case 2) periodic switching among aperiodic, and (case
5) stationary information flow. In general, information
flow vanishes when the system state is on a manifold M0
defined by xi′|ij =
∑
j p(j)xi′|ij and yj′|ij =
∑
i p(i)yj′|ij .
Information flow is maximized to log 2 when the system
state is on a manifold M1 defined by the set of points
which have maximal distance from M0. Case 5 with bi-
stability between a fixed point and heteloclinic cycle gives
us a clear example of stationary information flow. Be-
tween the manifold M0 and M1 we have dynamic flow
of information such as those in case 1 and 2 in Fig. 3.
Through adaptation, dynamic information flow emerges
by keeping rewards as large as possible at each moment,
and because of the complex game interaction and under-
lying causal structure.
The above is an extention of game dynamics for in-
teracting Markovian processes. If all units have com-
plete information of the previous global state s, or they
are all causally separated with no information of s, we
have a family of standard game dynamics. For interme-
diate cases with partial information of s, we have ex-
plicit stationary distribution terms in the equations of
motion. The presented examples show new types of phe-
nomena in contrast to standard game dynamics. Dynam-
ics of information flow between two units is discussed
based on underlying causal structure. When units are
ternary information sources, the presented game dynam-
ics shows chaotic behavior even in the simplest case Eqs.
(5) [5, 8, 9]. Studying adaptive dynamics forN units with
heterogeneous game interaction, and with various types
of causal networks is left for a future work. Rigorous
information theoretic analysis of the presented adaptive
dynamics will be covered more elsewhere. The relation-
ship between global and individual reward structure and
information flow among units would give us new insights
in game theory. Applications to ecological and social dy-
namics, econophysics, and studies on learning in game
are all straightforward.
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FIG. 3: (Top) Case 1: Aperiodic information flow. (Mid-
dle) Case 2: Periodic switching among aperiodic informa-
tion flow. (Bottom) Case 5: (a) stationary information flow
I(Y → X ′ : X,Y ) = I(X → Y ′ : X,Y ) = 0. (b) station-
ary information flow I(Y → X ′ : X,Y ) = 0.00305395 and
I(Y → X ′ : X,Y ) = 0.06023025.
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